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The Use of the CZMA Consistency Provisions to Preserve
and Restore the Coastal Zone in Louisiana
INTRODUCTION
The Louisiana Coastal Zone' is an invaluable natural resource for
both the state and the nation. 2 Unfortunately, the coastal wetlands of
Louisiana are disappearing at the alarming rate of approximately twenty-
five to fifty square miles each year 3-lost forever to erosion, saltwater
intrusion into freshwater estuaries, development, and ecological mis-
management.
There are three basic causes to which land loss in coastal Louisiana
can be attributed. First, there are the natural processes of land subsidence
and sea-level rise.4 At the present time, the rate of subsidence in coastal
Louisiana is 10-11 mm/yr (.40 -.44 in./yr), compared with an historic
rate of 1.55 mm/yr (.062 in./yr).5 Subsidence attributed to human causes,
such as the Mississippi River levee system and oil and gas extraction,
has been estimated at 7.25-8.25 mm/yr (.29-.33 in./yr).6 While the
subsidence rate of coastal Louisiana has increased dramatically in the
Copyright 1991, by LOUISIMNA LAW REVmW.
1. The Coastal Zone Management Act of 1972, 16 U.S.C. § 1454(b)(1) (1989),
requires the management program for each coastal state to include an identification of
the boundaries of the coastal zone subject to the management program. A narrative
description of the boundary of the Louisiana Coastal Zone is contained in La. R.S.
49:214.24 (Supp. 1990).
2. Houck, Land Loss in Coastal Louisiana: Causes, Consequences, and Remedies,
58 Tul. L. Rev. 3, 92-100 (1983). See also U.S. Department of Commerce, National
Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, Office of Coastal Zone Management and Louis-
iana Department of Natural Resources, Coastal Management Section, Louisiana Coastal
Resources Program Final Environmental Impact Statement, 22-32 (1980).
3. Houck, supra note 2, at 4. There is some dispute as to the exact rate of loss.
The latest estimates by the U.S. Wildlife and Fisheries Service put the loss at 25 square
miles per year, (see Miss. River Delta Making a Comeback, New Orleans Times-Picayune,
November 14, 1990, at C-1, col. 1.), while signs at the recently opened Aquarium of the
Americas in New Orleans put the loss at 60 square miles per year. In any event, the rate
of loss is substantial.
4. Coalition to Restore Coastal Louisiana, Coastal Louisiana, Here Today and Gone
Tomorrow? A Citizen's Program for Saving the Mississippi River Delta Region, To Protect
It's Heritage, Economy and Environment, at 16-17 (1989). See also Houck, supra note
2, at 12-15. Presently, the land subsidence rate form all causes (natural and man-made)
is 9 mm/yr, and the rate of sea-level rise is 1.2 mm/yr. Combined, the total land-sea
subsidence rate is 10-11 mm/yr.
5. See Houck, supra note 2, at 15.
6. Id.
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last 100 years (partly attributable to the loss of sediments which would
normally, absent the levee system, be deposited during flood season
when the Mississippi River would overflow its banks), and is certainly
a factor in coastal erosion, it must also be remembered that until only
recently, the same natural processes had produced only a small net land
loss?
Compounding the problems of natural subsidence and sea-level rise,
the second cause to which land loss can be attributed is the Mississippi
River levee system.' In its natural state, the river nourished and re-
plenished the wetlands during floods by depositing a portion of its
immense sediment load as the waters entered and passed through the
wetlands. Several studies have documented the detrimental effects of the
levee system9 on the coastal wetlands, but neither this cause alone nor
it in conjunction with subsidence can account for the continually ac-
celerating rate of coastal subsidence and erosion in Louisiana.' 0 As
Professor Houck points out:
There is a danger however in overplaying this role .... Con-
tinuous levees along the lower Mississippi River have been in
place since the late 1800's. Captain Eads' jetties were completed
in 1878. The Mississippi River has escaped these confinements
on only one occasion since 1913 [during the flood of 1927].
This history notwithstanding, subsidence along the Louisiana
coast was only a modest phenomenon until the mid-1950's.
Almost two-thirds of the subsidence has occurred in an escalating
pattern since that time.' 1
The same can be said of coastal land loss; it was a modest phenomenon
until the mid-1950's. Almost three-fifths of the losses have occurred in
an escalating pattern since that time.' 2 Why have the rates of both land
loss and subsidence escalated so dramatically in the last thirty to forty
years? The widely accepted answer may be found in the third major
7. Id. at 14-15, 22-24. Until the Mississippi River levee system was in place, the
Louisiana coastal zone was expanding, despite natural sea-level rise and natural subsidence.
Even after the levee system was put in place, subsidence in the coastal zone was only a
modest phenomenon until the mid-1950's. Id. at 24.
8. Id. at 16-24.
9. Gagliano, Canals, Dredging, and Land Reclamation in the Louisiana Coastal Zone
(1973) (cited in Houck, supra note 2, at 22). See also Gagliano, Meyer-Arendt & Wicker,
Land Loss in the Mississippi Deltaic Plain, in Transactions, 31st Annual Meeting, Gulf
Coast Association of Geological Societies 295, at 298 (1981) (cited in Houck, supra note
2, at 22-23).
10. Studies of coastal loss have demonstrated that the rate of loss has increased
dramatically since the 1950's. Houck, supra note 2, at 11-12. See also infra note 150.
11. Houck, supra note 2, at 23-24 (footnotes omitted).
12. Id. at 11-12.
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cause of wetlands loss in coastal Louisiana: dredging and development. 3
The extensive dredging conducted by the U.S. Army Corps of En-
gineers (Corps) and the oil and gas industry is done to facilitate nav-
igation and mineral exploration and production. 4 The oil industry alone
has been estimated to have dredged over 10,000 miles of canals within
the state in the last fifty years, and canals have been estimated to be
responsible for up to eighty-nine percent of the total land loss.'6 As for
the Corps, some of its larger scale projects, such as the Mississippi
River Gulf Outlet (MRGO), destroy vast amounts of wetlands both
during and after construction. The construction of the MRGO converted
6,653 acres of marsh to open water and buried another 17,344 acres
under spoil.' 7 The banks have now eroded in some places to three times
the original width, and saltwater intrusion up the canal has changed
the character of approximately 45,000 adjacent acres from freshwater
marsh to open water and brackish marsh. s
Given the above, one must recognize that there is probably little
that can be done about the rate of subsidence, though the Louisiana
Department of Wildlife and Fisheries has recently demonstrated that
controlled breaches in the Mississippi River levee system can create new
marsh where the old had been lost 19 by counteracting subsidence through
sediment deposition, thereby decreasing the net loss of wetlands in the
state. But while the Mississippi River levee system is obviously a culprit
in the increased rate of coastal wetlands loss, the fact is that it exists,
and will continue to remain in place for the foreseeable future. Controlled
13. Id. at 30-55. See also Treen, Law and Policy: The Continuing Need for CWEL,
I Tul. Envtl. L.J. 24 (1988); Batson, Ryan v. Southern Natural Gas Co.: Towards
Fashioning An Appropriate Measure of Damages for Land Loss in Coastal Louisiana, 1
Tul. Envtl. L.J. 8 (1988).
14. Houck, supra note 2, at 24-55.
15. Houck, Ending the War: A Strategy to Save America's Coastal Zone, 47 Md.
L. Rev. 358, 369 (1988).
16. Scaife, Turner & Costanza, Coastal Louisiana: Recent Land Loss and Canal
Impacts, 7 Envtl. Mgmt. 433, 440 (1983) (cited in Houck, supra note 15, at 370 n.58).
While the amount of loss which should be allocated to canals, pipelines, and other oil
industry related activities is debatable, even some oil industry supporters will concede that
an appreciable amount of damage does occur: "I concede that the level of harm resulting
from oil and gas activities, as compared to other causes, is arguable. However, even if
the estimate of damage resulting from oil and gas activities is reduced to 10%, or even
5%, the resulting numbers are monumental." Former Louisiana Governor David C. Treen,
who was serving on the board of directors of a large oil corporation at the time he wrote
this statement. See Treen, Law and Policy: The Continuing Need for CWEL, I Tul.
Envtl. L.J. 24, 26 (1988).
17. Houck, supra note 2, at 40.
18. Id. See also sources cited infra at notes 62, 64.
19. See Miss. River Delta Making a Comeback, New Orleans Times-Picayune, Nov.
14, 1990, at C-l, col. 1.
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breaches in the natural levee system near the mouth of the river may
be beneficial to that area of the coastal zone, 20 but given the importance
of the levee system to navigation on the river and to flood control in
such heavily populated areas as New Orleans, diversions of any sort
further upriver are a much more complicated and controversial matter.
2
'
Therefore, in any effort directed toward preservation and restoration
of the coastal zone, dredging and development remain as the cause of
loss which can be most easily and effectively alleviated-or at least
significantly controlled. Implicit in such a statement is the recognition
that the primary developers in the coastal zone, the Corps and the oil
industry, also will be the parties most affected by any such attempt to
preserve and restore the coastal zone.
22
With the above in mind, it should be explained that Louisiana is
not alone in its concern for maintaining the health of its coastal zone.
Since the passage of the Coastal Zone Management Act (CZMA) in
1972,23 twenty-eight of the thirty-five U.S. coastal states and territories
eligible for participation have voluntarily developed and implemented
comprehensive federally-approved coastal zone management programs.
24
With the passage of the Coastal Zone Act Reauthorization Amendments
of 1990,25 the few remaining non-participating states will probably also
choose to participate.
Louisiana passed the State and Local Coastal Resources Management
Act (SLCRMA) in 1978,26 and its subsequent approval by the U.S.
20. Id.
21. Houck, supra note 2, at 19-22. For an interesting discussion of the largest of
all possible "levee breaches" or "diversions"-the redistribution of flows of the Mississippi
and Atchafalaya Rivers through the river control structures north of Baton Rouge, see
Houck, supra note 2, at 102.
22. This is not meant to say that the Corps or the oil industry should or should
not be penalized for past actions in the coastal zone. Allocation of the costs of repairing
damage done to the wetlands in the past is not the subject matter of this comment.
Instead, this comment is directed toward gaining a larger measure of state control over
all future activities undertaken in the coastal zone.
23. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1451-1464 (1989). The CZMA was 'reauthorized and strengthened
by amendment in 1990. See Coastal Zone Act Reauthorization Amendments of 1990,
Pub. L. No. 101-508, §§ 6201-6216, 104 Stat. 1388 (1990).
24. Cunningham, Norfolk Southern Corp. v. Oberly: Coastal Protection Wins in
Delaware, 4 Pace Envtl. L. Rev. 439 n.4 (1987). Other coastal states face a myriad of
problems of a different nature than those encountered in Louisiana, including excessive
development, loss of public access to coastal areas, increased coastal zone pollution, and
offshore oil exploration.
25. Coastal Zone Act Reauthorization Amendments of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-508,
§§ 6201-6216, 104 Stat. 1388 (1990) [hereinafter cited as Reauthorization Amendments of
1990].
26. 1978 La. Acts No. 361, § 1. See also La. R.S. 49:214.21-214.40 (Supp. 1990).
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Secretary of Commerce 27 allowed Louisiana to create a state adminis-
trative agency for state coastal zone management under the authority
of the CZMA. This agency, the Coastal Management Division (CMD)
of the Department of Natural Resources (DNR), is responsible for state
compliance with and the exercise of authority granted by the CZMA. 2s
As part of the authority granted, the CMD is responsible for making
consistency determinations for activities conducted in the coastal zone
by federal agencies29 or federal permittees.30 Put somewhat simplistically,
a "consistency determination" means that anyone undertaking a regu-
lated activity in the coastal zone must certify to the state that the activity
he proposes to conduct in the coastal zone will be consistent with the
approved state Coastal Management Program (CMP). Only if the state
concurs (with limited exceptions) with the certification will the activity
be consistent for CZMA purposes. Along with federal funding offered
to assist states in establishing and operating coastal management pro-
grams,3 ' the federal consistency requirements 32 are at the heart of the
CZMA. It is these provisions which allow a state to exert a great deal
of control over activities in or affecting the coastal zone by essentially
giving states a "veto" power over any federal activity or any activity
requiring a federal permit or license. Unfortunately, Louisiana has yet
to exercise its authority to the extent allowed by law under the CZMA
and SLCRMA.
Through an examination of the applicable statutory law, 33 relevant
case law, and the actions of other coastal states, this comment will
demonstrate that Louisiana has not used the full extent of its consistency
determination powers to control activities in the coastal zone. By not
doing so, Louisiana is failing to effectively use a powerful tool in the
fight to preserve its wetlands and combat coastal erosion. This comment
proposes that Louisiana should, at a minimum, use the consistency
provisions as aggressively as they are used in other coastal states. This
27. The SLCRMA and the Louisiana Coastal Resources Program FEIS were submitted
for and received the approval of the U.S. Secretary of Commerce in 1980.
28. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1451-1464 (1989), as amended by the Reauthorization Amendments
of 1990, §§ 6201-6216. See also 15 C.F.R. Part 930 (1990).
29. 16 U.S.C. § 1456(c)(1)-(2) (1989), as amended by the Reauthorization Amendments
of 1990, § 6208(a).
30. 16 U.S.C. § 1456(c)(3)(A)-(B) (1989), as amended by the Reauthorization Amend-
ments of 1990, § 6208(b).
31. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1454-1455a (1989), as amended by the Reauthorization Amendments
of 1990, §§ 6205, 6206, 6207, 6209, 6210.
32. 16 U.S.C. § 1456(c) (1989), as amended by the Reauthorization Amendments of
1990, § 6208.
33. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1451-1464 (1989), as amended by the Reauthorization Amendments
of 1990, §§ 6201-6216; 15 C.F.R. Part 930 (1990); La. R.S. 49:214.21-214.40 (Supp.
1990); La. Admin. Code 43:1.701-43:1.731 (1990).
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comment further proposes that Louisiana should, in certain situations,
use the CZMA consistency provisions to force federal agencies and their
permittees to conduct their activities in the coastal zone in a manner
that has a positive effect, not merely a non-detrimental effect, on the
coastal zone environment.
With these proposals in mind, the comment first focuses on the
CZMA and the consistency provisions contained therein. Second, ex-
amples and explanations of the "types" of consistency determinations
with which the state is concerned are provided. Third, the comment
discusses what Louisiana has been doing and what it should be doing,
comparing Louisiana's actions with those of other coastal states. Fourth,
the feasibility of the proposals is discussed. Fifth, the comment examines
possible obstacles to the course of action proposed herein. Finally, the
conclusion will contain a short costs/benefits analysis reemphasizing why
Louisiana should attempt to implement the proposals made in this
comment.
THE COASTAL ZoNE MANAGEMENT ACT
The Coastal Zone Management Act of 197234 was passed by Congress
in order to "preserve, protect, develop, and where possible, to restore
or enhance, the resources of the Nation's coastal zone" 35 and to "en-
courage and assist the states to exercise effectively their responsibilities
in the coastal zone through the development and implementation of
management programs to achieve wise use of the land and water re-
sources of the coastal zone.''36 In the Coastal Zone Act Reauthorization
Amendments of 1990, 37 Congress has gone even further in its encour-
agement to the states, stating that "[i]t is the purpose of Congress in
this subtitle to enhance the effectiveness of the Coastal Zone Management
Act of 1972 by increasing our understanding of the coastal environment
and expanding the ability of State coastal zone management programs
to address coastal environmental problems.' '38 To effectuate these policy
objectives Congress has encouraged coastal states to participate in the
management and development of their coastal zones by providing federal
funding to help states set up and operate coastal zone management
programs. 39 As further incentive, and at the heart of the CZMA, Con-
34. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1451-1464 (1989), as amended by the Reauthorization Amendments
of 1990, §§ 6201-6216.
35. 16 U.S.C. § 1452(1) (1989).
36. 16 U.S.C. § 1452(2) (1989).
37. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1451-1464 (1989), as amended by the Reauthorization Amendments
of 1990, §§ 6201-6216.
38. Reauthorization Amendments of 1990, § 6202(b) (emphasis added).
39. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1454-1455a (1989), as amended by the Reauthorization Amendments
of 1990, §§ 6205, 6206, 6207, 6209, 6210.
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gress enacted in the CZMA a system dubbed by legal scholars as "new
federalism'' 4 by which a state is able, through its consistency deter-
mination authority, to exert control over activities in its coastal zone.
Once a state Coastal Management Program (CMP) has been ap-
proved by the U.S. Secretary of Commerce, 4' the CZMA requires that
federal activities and projects affecting the coastal zone, as well as
activities and projects conducted by private parties which require a federal
permit or license, be consistent with the approved state CMP. 42 Distinct
sets of consistency standards and procedures apply to (1) federal agency
activities43 and (2) other activities that require a federal permit or license.4 '
In the first instance, federal agency activities "within or outside the
coastal zone that affect[s] any land or water use or natural resource of
the coastal zone shall be carried out in a manner which is consistent
to the maximum extent practicable with the enforceable policies of
approved State management programs. "41 The federal agency which
conducts or supports the activity makes the consistency determination,
and the state may concur or object.4 If the state objects, it may pursue
mediation by the U.S. Secretary of Commerce or seek judicial inter-
vention to enjoin the activity.47
In the second case, federally permitted activities," including outer-
Continental Shelf (OCS) lease sales, exploration, and development and
production, must be conducted in a manner consistent with the state
CMP. 49 Applicants for a federal permit must "certify" to the state
40. Eichenberger and Archer, The Federal Consistency Doctrine: Coastal Zone Man-
agement and "New Federalism," 14 Ecology L.Q. 9, 11 (1987). In federal-state cooperative
environmental programs, federal agencies and state governments jointly manage resources
and development once exclusively managed by the federal government.
41. 16 U.S.C. § 1455 (1989), as amended by the Reauthorization Amendments of
1990, § 6206. As to administration of the CZMA, the Secretary of Commerce has delegated
his authority under the CZMA to the assistant administrator of the National Oceanic and
Atmospheric Administration (NOAA). See 15 C.F.R. §§ 923, 930.1, 930.15-.16 (1990).





46. Id. See also 15 C.F.R. Part 930, Subpart C (1990). It should be noted that the
regulations concerning the administration of the CZMA contained in 15 C.F.R. Part 930
will soon be changed to reflect the changes made to the CZMA by amendment in the
Coastal Zone Act Reauthorization Amendments of 1990.
47. 16 U.S.C. § 1456(h) (1989); 15 C.F.R. § 930.116 (1990).
48. E.g., private activities which require a federal permit or license, such as the
dredging of a canal through privately owned wetlands areas.
49. 16 U.S.C. § 1456(c)(3)(A)-(B) (1989), as amended by the Reauthorization Amend-
ments of 1990, §6208. As for outer-Continental Shelf (OCS) lease sales, see the controversial
case Secretary of the Interior v. California, 464 U.S. 312, 104 S. Ct. 656 (1984), which
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agency that the proposed activity complies with the state's approved
program. 0 If the state agency objects, the federal agency may not issue
the necessary permits unless, on appeal or his own initiative, the Secretary
of Commerce overrides the state objection. 5 The Secretary may override
a state objection upon a finding that the activity is either consistent
with the objectives of the CZMA 2 or is necessary in the interest of
national security.5"
In Louisiana, the Louisiana State and Local Coastal Resources Man-
agement Act (SLCRMA) functions as the state coastal management
program for CZMA purposes.14 The SLCRMA established the state
coastal zone boundary,5 5 implemented a coastal use permitting system
to regulate activities occurring in the coastal zone, 56 and provided for
the development of state "coastal use guidelines" to serve as the criteria
for granting, conditioning, denying, revoking, or modifying coastal use
permits.57 The Coastal Use Guidelines are quite extensive and allow
the state to review' virtually all significant activities occurring in the
coastal zone area.
"TYPES" OF CONSISTENCY DETERMINATIONS MADE BY THE STATE
In addition to the division of activities in the CZMA into those of
federal agencies and those of federal permittees, the consistency deter-
mination problems that Louisiana encounters can further be divided into
four categories: (1) activities initiated prior to the approval of the state
CMP; (2) activities for which no consistency determination was required
at their initiation but for which the state has subsequently determined
held that the consistency provisions of the CZMA did not apply to the Department of
the Interior's sale of oil and gas leases on the OCS. Section 6208(a) of the Reauthorization
legislatively overrules the case and provides a major victory for coastal states desiring to
interpret the CZMA consistency provisions in an aggressive manner. See Morris, Review
Clause Could Delay MMS's Planned Gulf Lease Sale, Inside Energy/with Federal Lands,
December 17, 1990, at 11; Shuler, Proposal May Give La. More Oil Money, Baton Rouge
State-Times/Morning Advocate, February 23, 1991, at C-l, col. 2.
50. 16 U.S.C. § 1456(c)(3)(A) (1989), as amended by the Reauthorization Amendments
of 1990, §6208(b)(2).
51. Id. See also 15 C.F.R. §§ 930.120-930.122 (1990).
52. 16 U.S.C. § 1456 (c)(3)(A) (1989), as amended by the Reauthorization Amendments
of 1990, § 6208(b)(2). See also 15 C.F.R. §§ 930.120-930.121 (1990).
53. 16 U.S.C. § 1456(c)(3)(A) (1989), as amended by the Reauthorization Amendments
of 1990, § 6208(b)(2). See also 15 C.F.R. §§ 930.120, 930.122 (1990).
54. 1978 La. Acts No. 361, § 1. See also La. R.S. 49:214.21-214.40 (Supp. 1990).
55. La. R.S. 49:214.24 (Supp. 1990).
56. La. R.S. 49:214.30-214.36 (Supp. 1990).
57. La. R.S. 49:214.27 (Supp. 1990).
58. The Coastal Use Guidelines are contained in the La. Admin. Code 43:1.701-
43:1.731 (1990). See infra note 88.
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do require a consistency determination; (3) activities for which a con-
sistency determination has already been made, but which are not being
conducted in conformity with the state CMP or the Coastal Use Guide-
lines; and (4) activities which have not yet come up for a consistency
determination.
Activities Initiated Prior to the Approval of the State CMP
Activities initiated prior to approval of the state CMP are of two
types: (a) ongoing federal activities other than development projects 9
and (b) phased federal development projects. 6° Other activities which
require federal permits do not have any bearing on this category, as all
such activities are subject to consistency determinations upon renewal
of the federal permit or license. 61
An example of a federal activity which should be held to be subject
to consistency review is the dredging of the Mississippi River Gulf Outlet
(MRGO) by the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (Corps) every six years. 62
The CMD recently notified the Corps that it objected to the planned
Corps method of spoil disposal in the dredging of the MRGO scheduled
for 1991.63 The Corps plan calls for the dredged material to be deposited
on the south bank of the shipping channel; the CMD would like the
spoil to be deposited on the north shore to help control erosion of the
wetlands north of the canal. The CMD has notified the Corps that the
plan submitted by the Corps is not consistent with the Louisiana CMP,
and that the state is prepared to pursue an administrative appeal and
possibly litigation. 64 Combined with the CMD determination on the Corps
levee project problem explained below,6 this may signal a major change
in the way CMD views the consistency determination authority granted
to it by the CZMA.
Prior to this year, the CMD had not attempted to require a new
consistency determination for any federal activity or development project
initiated prior to approval of the state coastal management program. If
the MRGO dredging dispute is not resolved by mediation and instead
59. 15 C.F.R. § 930.38(a) (1990). An example is maintenance dredging of an existing
waterway such as the MRGO or the Intracoastal Canal.
60. 15 C.F.R. § 930.38(b) (1990). An example is the phased construction of hurricane
protection levee systems.
61. 15 C.F.R. §§ 930.50-930.51 (1990). Any private activities in the coastal zone
would fall under this category.
62. See State Wants Corps to Revise Channel Dredge Plan, New Orleans Times-
Picayune, August 29, 1990, at B-l, col. 1.
63. Id.
64. See Corps Refuses to Alter Dredging on Gulf Outlet, New Orleans Times-Picayune,
October 24, 1990, at B-8, col. 1.
65. See infra text accompanying notes 69-75.
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proceeds to litigation, the court may hold that it is an activity "other
than [a] development project," in which case the Corps will be required
by regulation to submit a new consistency determination. 6 If, however,
the court determines that the dredging is a "phased Federal decision
which [was] specifically described, considered and approved prior to
management program approval (e.g., in a final environmental impact
statement [FEIS] issued pursuant to the National Environmental Policy
Act [NEPA])," 67 the CMD will then have to demonstrate that the Corps
is acting in a manner that is substantially different from the FEIS, or
that the impact is substantially greater than that contemplated in the
FEIS."
An example of a phased development project initiated before ap-
proval of the State CMP which should be found to be subject to a
consistency determination is the Corps' LaRose-to-Golden Meadow levee
project in LaFourche Parish. The levee project was planned and initiated
prior to approval of the state Coastal Management Program, and the
Corps issued a FEIS purporting to cover the project from beginning to
completion. 9 The Corps now appears to be altering its original project
plan in a substantial manner by changing the alignment of the levee,
which may have significantly different and substantially greater envi-
ronmental impact in the wetlands areas adjacent to the project.70 As
the CMD views it, the Corps should have to submit a new consistency
determination which takes into account the effects of the proposed
change in the alignment of the levee. The Corps apparently believes that
the project is exempt from any further consistency review by the "grand-
father clause" of 15 CFR 930.38(b). 71 The only case involving a similar
fact situation is Enos v. Marsh.7 2 In Enos, plaintiffs asserted (in part)
a violation of the CZMA where a federal project (a harbor project by
66. 15 C.F.R. § 930.38(a) (1990).
67. 15 C.F.R. § 930.38(b) (1990).
68. A court determination of this nature is highly unlikely in this dispute, as the
Corps has already demonstrated by its actions (i.e. the Corps has already submitted a
consistency determination) that it does not consider maintenance dredging of the MRGO
a phased federal development project. See supra notes 62, 64. However, even if the court
were to make such a determination, the CMD should not have any problem demonstrating
that the maintenance dredging is having an impact substantially greater than that con-
templated in the FEIS. See supra text accompanying notes 17-18.
69. Memo from M. Wascom, CMD Legal Staff, DNR, to J. DeMond, CMD Federal
Consistency Section, DNR, regarding the possible change in levee alignment by the Corps
(August 6, 1990) (on file at the Sea Grant Legal Program, Paul M. Hebert Law Center,
Louisiana State University).
70. Id.
71. Id. 15 C.F.R. 930.38(b) states, in pertinent part, that "This provision shall not
apply to phased Federal decisions which were specifically described, considered and ap-
proved prior to management program approval (e.g., in a final environmental impact
statement issued pursuant to the National Environmental Policy Act)."
72. 616 F. Supp. 32 (D. Hawaii 1984), aff'd, 769 F.2d 1363 (9th Cir. 1985).
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the Corps) was "initiated" prior to approval of the state CMP, though
actual construction began after approval of the state CMP. The court
held in part: (1) that 15 CFR 930.38(b) (the "grandfather clause") applied
and that the original EIS was sufficient; therefore new consistency
determinations were not required as each phase was undertaken, and
(2) that changes made in the actual development work did not rise to
a level of significance which would require a new consistency deter-
mination. This part of Enos is relevant in deciding whether a new
consistency determination may be required of the Corps in the change
of levee alignment in two respects. First, the court in Enos, basing its
conclusions on 15 CFR 930.38(b) and policy considerations,7 decided
that projects initiated prior to approval of the state CMP and supported
by a FEIS are entitled to a "presumption" of sufficiency. In other
words, absent significant changes in the plan and development work,
the Corps is covered by the "grandfather clause" of 15 CFR 930.38(b).
Second, the court did not "close the door" to future plaintiffs in
similar cases. By basing its ruling, in part, on the small magnitude of
the change involved, the court implied that should the changes be grossly
inconsistent with the original plan put forth and covered by the FEIS,
the question of whether a new consistency determination could be re-
quired would still be open to litigation. 74 As the CZMA and 15 CFR
Part 930 set up a strong policy favoring agency compliance with state
CMP's through consistency determinations7 5 the Corps should be viewed
as operating in its levee alignment project under what should be construed
as a narrow exception to the general rule. Therefore, if the changes in
the alignment cause additional environmental impact of a significant
nature and scope, the CMD should be able to prevail in court and force
the Corps to submit a new consistency determination.
Both the levee alignment change and the dredging of the MRGO
present an opportunity to the CMD to assert its authority and exercise
some measure of control over the fate of large areas of the coastal
zone. Should the CMD prevail in these two situations, it would provide
the CMD with a greatly enhanced ability to limit coastal zone destruction,
as the Corps is involved in many activities initiated prior to the approval
of the state CMP.
Activities for Which No Consistency Determination was Required at
Initiation But for Which the State has Subsequently Determined Do
Require a Consistency Determination
As for activities for which no consistency determination was required
at the time of their initiation, but for which the state has subsequently
73. Enos, 616 F. Supp. at 63-64.
74. Enos, 616 F. Supp. at 64.
75. See the "Findings and Purpose" contained in the Reauthorization Amendments
of 1990, §6202.
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determined do require a consistency determination, the state may make
a request to the agency conducting the activity for remedial action to
correct the problem causing the CMD to view the activity as incon-
sistent 7 6 If no remedial action is taken in a reasonable time, the state
may pursue mediation by the Secretary of Commerce or seek relief in
court.77
Activities for Which a Consistency Determination Has Already Been
Made, But Which Are Not Being Conducted in Conformity With the
State CMP Or the Coastal Use Guidelines
As a general rule, once a federal activity or an activity of a federal
permittee has received a favorable consistency determination by the state,
it is not subject to any further consistency determinations. 7 This rule
is based primarily on the principle of estoppel. 79 However, when an
activity is being conducted in a manner not in conformity with the state
CMP, the same rule that applies to activities not previously required to
have a consistency determination but subsequently determined to be
subject to the consistency determination authority applies: the CMD may
request remedial action, and if no action is taken in a reasonable time,
the CMD may seek Secretarial mediation or take the matter to court.80
This means that while the state has the ability to restrict any activities
which deviate from a previously granted consistency determination, it
must be very careful in its granting of an initial consistency determi-
nation. After the state approves the initial consistency determination it
is effectively estopped from interfering with the activity as long as the
activity does not significantly deviate from that initially approved. There-
fore, the critical point in the process is the initial determination.
Activities For Which a Consistency Determination Has Not Yet Been
Made
The point at which the state has the greatest ability to exert influence
over an activity in the coastal zone is, ironically, before the activity is
ever actually initiated. It is therefore imperative that Louisiana exert its
power and authority during the initial consistency determination phase
to the fullest extent allowed by law. Ideally, Louisiana should be using
its consistency determination powers as a tool to further state coastal
zone objectives: slowing erosion and saltwater intrusion, and the re-
76. 15 C.F.R. § 930.44(b) (1990).
77. 15 C.F.R. § 930.44(c) (1990), and 15 C.F.R. Part 930, Subpart G (1990).
78. Enos, 616 F. Supp. at 63-64.
79. Id.
80. 15 C.F.R. §§ 930.44(b)-(c) (1990), and 15 C.F.R. Part 930, Subpart G (1990).
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building of the marshes and wetlands through the use of water diversions,
spoil deposition from development projects, and mitigation. Unfortu-
nately, this is not what has been happening in Louisiana during the
past 13 years."
There are two parts to the proposal made in this comment, and
for the sake of clarity and understanding they will be repeated here.
First, when compared to other coastal states, Louisiana has not been
using the consistency determination powers it has been granted in an
efficient manner. Second, in certain situations, Louisiana should be using
its consistency determination powers to force a party conducting activities
in the coastal zone to act in a manner that will yield positive environ-
mental results instead of merely non-detrimental effects in the coastal
zone. As to the first proposition, a simple analysis of empirical infor-
mation provides some very incriminating evidence. In Louisiana, the
state with the highest volume of coastal permit issuance in the nation,
the rate of Clean Water Act section 404 dredge and fill permit 2 denials
by the Corps from 1980-1986 averaged 6.3 denials a year, or approx-
imately 0.64% of the applications considered.83 During that period, an
average of 899 permits" a year were considered. As each of these Corps
permittees was required by the CZMA to obtain a consistency deter-
mination from the CMD before the Corps would be allowed to issue
the permit, 5 and as the majority of these permits involved oil and gas
industry access to facilities in the coastal zone, 6 it would appear that
the CMD has been solicitous to energy industry concerns at the expense
of the environment. These undesirable results have not occurred because
the law is not strict enough or lacks potency; Louisiana's CMP and
Coastal Use Guidelines 7 provide the state with the ability to affect
virtually any activity in the coastal zone, and to effectively halt most
activities if it should so choose.88
81. See Houck, supra note 15, at 369-74. The "13 years" refer to the time which
has passed since the passage of the SLCRMA in 1978.
82. Federal Water Pollution Control Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1344 (Clean Water Act §404)
(1989). A "dredge and fill" permit is required from the Corps for most dredging operations
in the coastal zone.
83. See Houck, supra note 15 n.16.
84. Id. at 370.
85. 15 C.F.R. §§ 930.53(e), 930.65 (1990).
86. See Houck, supra note 2, at 24-44. See also Houck, supra note 15, at 369-70.
87. La. Admin. Code 43:1.701-43:1.731 (1990).
88. Id. The Coastal Use Guidelines provide stringent requirements which must be
met by any actor in the coastal zone. In addition to broad general application guidelines,
the Coastal Use Guidelines also contain specific guidelines for levees, linear facilities
(pipelines), dredged spoil deposition, shore modification, surface alterations, hydrologic




In comparison, other coastal states and territories have acted in a
much more aggressive manner in their use of the consistency determi-
nation powers. Delaware has used its powers to completely ban any new
bulk transfer facilities in the Delaware coastal zone. 9 California has
acted to protect its coastal fishing industry by forcing the oil industry
to conduct its offshore exploration activities only while the fishing season
is closed.9 California has also used its powers to restrict onshore
development 9' and to control the method of removal of structures such
as rail lines before they are abandoned. 92 Puerto Rico has used its
powers to enjoin the federal government from transferring Haitian and
Cuban refugees to a camp on a U.S. Army Base on the island, 9 citing
physical plant deficiencies at the base. Other coastal states are acting
aggressively to halt or control detrimental activities in their coastal zones;
not so in Louisiana. The state has rarely used its consistency determi-
nation powers to restrain or halt an activity in the coastal zone, especially
if the activity is being conducted by the Corps or is oil industry related. 94
If the state ever hopes to slow coastal erosion and preserve the
coastal zone, it will have to make use of its powers in the way other
coastal states have. This means that the CMD must view the CZMA
as the environmental protectionist measure it is intended to be95 and
assert its authority more aggressively.
To this end, the state should also try to extend the parameters of
its CZMA authority by using the consistency determination powers to
force federal agencies and their permittees to conduct their activities in
a manner that will produce positive effects in the coastal zone envi-
ronment. This means that in some cases, the state should not be satisfied
with the plan for an activity and grant the consistency determination
89. See Norfolk Southern Corp. v. Oberly, 632 F. Supp. 1225 (D. Del. 1986), aff'd,
822 F.2d 388 (3rd Cir. 1987). See also Comment, Norfolk Southern Corp. v. Oberly:
Coastal Protection Wins in Delaware, 4 Pace Envtl. L. Rev. 439 (1987).
90. See Exxon Corp. v. Fischer, No. 84-2362 (D. Cal. Oct. 9, 1985), rev'd on other
grounds, 807 F.2d 842 (9th Cir. 1986). See also Fitzgerald, Exxon Corp. v. Fischer:
Thresher Sharks Protect the Coastal Zone, 14 Envtl. Affairs 561 (1987).
91. See California Coastal Commission v. Granite Rock Company, 480 U.S. 572,
107 S. Ct. 1419 (1987). See also Comment, State Control of Mining on Federal Land:
Environmental Or Land Use Regulation?, 28 Nat. Resources J. 873 (1988).
92. See Southern Pacific Transportation Co. v. California Coastal Commission, 520
F. Supp. 800 (N.D. Cal. 1981).
93. See Commonwealth of Puerto Rico v. Muskie, 507 F. Supp. 1035 (D.P.R. 1981),
vacated due to a consent agreement in Marquez-Colon v. Reagan, 668 F.2d 611 (1st Cir.
1981).
94. See supra sources cited in note 86.




when the plan merely provides that the activity will not do any significant
harm to the environment. For example, in the MRGO dredging dispute, 96
the canal has almost eroded through to an adjoining lake, and if such
a breach occurs, it will hasten erosion of the adjoining wetlands and
possibly damage the levee system that protects St. Bernard parish from
hurricane surges. 97 The Corps plan calls for the disposal of the dredge
spoil to be accomplished in the cheapest manner possible9S-by depositing
it on the south shore of the canal. The CMD contends that the Corps
must comply with the state requirement for using dredge spoil whenever
possible to create wetlands and prevent environmental damage. 99 It is
in situations such as this that the state should require, where feasible,
a "positive" contribution to the coastal zone environment. Merely set-
tling for "minor damage/impact" in the coastal zone will only mod-
erately Slow the rate of destruction. Louisiana's coastal zone has been
beyond that point for some time now. 100
How AND WHY LouIsIANA SHOULD BE ABLE TO AcCOMPLISH THE
PROPOSALS MADE IN THIS COMMENT
Louisiana should be able to accomplish the proposals made in this
comment by aggressively using its CZMA powers in a variety of ways.
First, the consistency provisions of the CZMA and 15 CFR Part 930
give the state an effective "veto" power. While not absolute, 0' the state
determination does carry the presumption that it is the correct decision, 02
96. See supra text accompanying notes 62-64.
97. See supra note 64.
98. Id. See also letter from Col. Richard Gorski, District Engineer, New Orleans
District, Corps of Engineers, to D. Soileau, Asst. Secretary, DNR, CMD (October 16,
1990) (on file at Sea Grant Legal Program, Paul M. Hebert Law Center, Louisiana State
University). In the letter, Col. Gorski acknowledges that the Corps' own studies have
concluded that the better method of spoil disposal would be that proposed by the CMD,
but then goes on to say that the Corps maintenance dredging regulations require the
Corps to "place dredged material in the least costly manner consistent with sound en-
gineering practices and meeting required environmental standards." The CMD contends
that spoil disposal on the south shore does not meet "required environmental standards."
See infra note 99.
99. Under Louisiana's federally approved coastal management plan, and specifically
under Coastal Use Guideline 4.2, "[s]poil shall be used beneficially to the maximum extent
practicable to improve productivity or create new habitat, reduce or compensate for
environmental damage done by dredging activities, or prevent environmental damage."
See La. Admin. Code 43:1.707(B) (emphasis added).
100. See Houck, supra note 15, at 369-70.
101. 16 U.S.C. § 1456(c)(3)(A)-(B) (1989), as amended by the Reauthorization Amend-
ments of 1990, § 6208. See also 15 C.F.R. §§ 930.120-930.122 (1990).
102. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1452, 1456 (1989), as amended by the Reauthorization Amendments
of 1990, §§ 6202, 6208. See also Beyle, A Comparison of the Federal Consistency Doctrine
Under FLPMA and the CZMA, 9 Va. Envtl. L.J. 207, 207-16 (1989).
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and it is up to the agency or permittee to prove it wrong or inap-
propriate. 103 Second, the CZMA and 15 CFR Part 930 provide for
mediation by the Secretary of Commerce when disagreements concerning
a consistency determination arise.'0 In the case of federal agency ac-
tivities, either the state or the federal agency may request mediation,
though it is not required of either party-litigation is always an option. 0
If both parties agree to mediation, a public hearing is conducted in the
area to be affected by the proposed activity, and the Secretary of
Commerce uses the hearing record to conduct a mediation conference.
The state, through this formal negotiation session, should be able to
"encourage" the agency to modify its proposed plan of action. In the
case of a federal permittee, there are no provisions in the Code of
Federal Regulations which allow for formal mediation by the Secretary,
but the certification and appeals processes are designed to encourage
negotiation and compromise between all of the parties involved.'0 Once
again, the CMD should be able to "encourage" the would-be permittee
to modify its plans.
The third method by which the state should be able to accomplish
the goals set forth in this comment is by resorting to litigation when
the process outlined above does not prove satisfactory. In both types
of consistency determinations (federal agency and federal permittee ac-
tivities), the state has the option of litigation both before and after any
Secretarial action on the matter. 107 Given the strong "Findings and
Purpose" statement inserted by Congress in the Coastal Zone Act Reau-
thorization Amendments of 1990,108 the extensive coverage of activities
contained in the Coastal Use Guidelines,' °9 and the track record of other
coastal states when disputes have gone as far as litigation, '" 0 Louisiana
should win more than its share of the cases.
Finally, the state should, over time, be able to use the sheer coercive
pressure of the above plan of action to force change, both in the type
of proposals submitted for a consistency determination and in the manner
in which federal agencies and their permittees attempt to conduct their
activities in the coastal zone."' By strictly interpreting the Louisiana
103. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1452, 1456 (1989), as amended by the Reauthorization Amendments
of 1990, §§ 6202, 6208. See also Beyle, supra note 102.
104. See 16 U.S.C. § 1456(h) (1989) and 15 C.F.R. §§ 930.43-930.44, 930.55, 930.66,
930.110-930.116 (1990).
105. 15 C.F.R. § 930.116 (1990).
106. 15 C.F.R. §§ 930.64, 930.123-930.134 (1990).
107. 15 C.F.R. § 930.116 (1990).
108. Reauthorization Amendments of 1990, § 6202.
109. La. Admin. Code 43:1.701-43:1.731 (1990). See supra note 88.
110. See supra notes 89-93.
111. For an example of the ability of the state to use its consistency determination
powers in a moderately coercive manner, see Proposal May Give La. More Oil Money,
Baton Rouge State-Times/Morning Advocate, February 23, 1991, at C-1, col. 2.
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Coastal Use Guidelines, consistently "vetoing" proposed activities which
do not contribute to the environmental health of the coastal zone,
aggressively pursuing mediation and appeals to the Secretary of Com-
merce, and litigation, the state will eventually wear down its opponents.
While neither the Corps, the oil industry, nor developers will suc-
cumb to such tactics without a fight, and while the state will undoubtedly
lose its share of the battles, it should ultimately prevail because it will
turn the whole process into an administrative ordeal. To the oil industry
and developers (and to a lesser extent the Corps) time is money. The
entire process described above is, most of all, time consuming. Faced
with the prospect of seemingly endless submissions of data, hearings,
administrative appeals, and court challenges the federal agencies and
permittees conducting activities in the coastal zone should soon come
to the conclusion that it is more cost effective to coordinate and co-
operate with the CMD than to fight a government bureaucracy armed
as it is with Congressional backing." 2
POSSIBLE OBSTACLES TO THE COURSE OF ACTION
PROPOSED IN THIS COMMENT
Override Provisions
The first obstacle to the course of action proposed in this comment
is the "override" provisions of the CZMA and its supporting regula-
tions."' In the case of federal permittees the Secretary of Commerce
may find, on his own initiative or upon appeal by the applicant, that
the proposed activity is either: (1) consistent with the objectives or
purpose of the CZMA, or (2) is necessary in the interest of national
security.1"4 In the case of a federal agency activity, after a final judgment
in a federal court finding an agency activity not consistent with a state
CMP, the President may exempt the agency from compliance if he
determines that the activity is in the paramount interest of the United
States. ' In the former case, if such a finding or determination is made,
the state will be left with only two options: (1) to accept the override
and allow the activity to be conducted, or (2) to challenge it in court.
112. See the Findings and Purpose contained in the Reauthorization Amendments of
1990, § 6202.
113. 16 U.S.C. § 1456(c)(3)(A) (1989), as amended by the Reauthorization Amendments
of 1990, § 6208. See also 15 C.F.R. §§ 930.120-930.122 (1990).
114. 16 U.S.C. § 1456(c)(3)(A) (1989), as amended by the Reauthorization Amendments
of 1990, § 6208. See also 15 C.F.R. §§ 930.120-930.122 (1990).
115. Reauthorization Amendments of 1990, § 6208(a).
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In the latter case, the Presidential determination appears to be final." 6
Whatever the substantive basis of the challenge may be, it will be
reviewed by the court using administrative law principles. As such, the
determination by the Secretary will be accorded great deference, and
the state will have to challenge his decision as arbitrary and capricious
or as an abuse of discretion." 7 Given such a difficult burden of proof,
the state will probably only occasionally succeed in overturning an
override of either type. However, the standard imposed by statute", on
the federal government is also high in that it requires a formal finding
or determination be made in each case before the state decision can be
overridden, and the basis for the required finding is limited in scope." 9
Finally, there is the reality of the circumstances: the more than two
dozen participating coastal state programs, bolstered by the recent Con-
gressional action, 20 will probably begin to collectively assert more au-
thority in protecting their coastal areas through consistency determinations.
Therefore, while the possibility of an override may seem to be a for-
midable obstacle to the implementation of the proposals made in this
comment, in practice an override is unlikely to affect more than a small
percentage of the adverse consistency determinations made by the coastal
states.
Retaliatory Federal Coercive Powers
The second possible obstacle is that the federal government and the
Secretary of Commerce have the ability to exert coercive powers of their
own on the state through the withholding of grants and loans related
to the CZMA.' 2' Should Louisiana exercise its consistency determination
powers in the manner proposed, it might, in the process, get too far
116. See 15 C.F.R. § 930.130(d) (1990). In either case (federal agency activity or
federal permittee), final action by the Secretary of Commerce on an appeal constitutes
final agency action for the purposes of the Administrative Procedure Act. The Presidential
exemption for federal agency activities is not applicable until a final judgment in federal
court finds an agency activity not consistent with an approved state coastal management
plan. See the Reauthorization Amendments of 1990, § 6208(a).
117. See Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 91 S. Ct.
814 (1971).
118. 16 U.S.C. § 1456(c)(3) (1989), as amended by the Reauthorization Amendments
of 1990, § 6208. See also 15 C.F.R. §§ 930.120-930.122 (1990).
119. 16 U.S.C. § 1456(c)(3) (1989), as amended by the Reauthorization Amendments
of 1990, § 6208. See also 15 C.F.R. §§ 930.120-930.122 (1990).
120. Reauthorization Amendments of 1990, §§ 6201-6216.
121. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1454-1455a (1989), as amended by the Reauthorization Amendments
of 1990, §§ 6205, 6206, 6207, 6209, 6210.
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ahead of the Commerce Department."2 Given the fact that both the
Bush administration and the oil industry 23 adamantly opposed the reau-
thorization, the Commerce Department will probably not eagerly reward
states which use their consistency determination power aggressively with
discretionary grants and loans. However, as the recent passage by Con-
gress of a wetlands preservation measure granting Louisiana $35 million
this year and possibly $50 million per year in the future demonstrates,
the state is not without its supporters in Washington in its efforts to
protect its coastal zone.Y'
Economic Obstructions
Next, the state will probably incur some economic losses as well as
resultant political upheaval if the CMD starts to aggressively assert its
authority. Short term losses may occur in oil royalties and oil industry
related tax revenues, as well as in income tax and sales tax revenues
from especially hard hit areas'2 where workers suffer job losses attrib-
utable to decreased oil and gas exploration and production. However,
the oil industry, like any business, is directed by the bottom line. If
the price of oil is at a level which offsets the increased costs of com-
pliance with the more stringent coastal protection measures urged herein,
this particular obstacle may never be encountered.'1 s The state may also
suffer from slowdowns and stoppages of Corps development projects.
However, as the state will be the one making the decision on the
122. The Department of Commerce, which includes the NOAA (see supra note 41)
is, of course, within the executive branch of the U.S. government. It is therefore noteworthy
that the Bush administration opposed the reauthorization of the CZMA as amended by
Congress. Prior to passage, the President threatened a veto, claiming that certain amend-
ments would "shift the focus of the CZMA from balanced management to coastal
protection." See Morris, White House Tells Congress CZMA Reauthorization Bill May
Draw Veto, Inside Energy with Federal Lands, October 1, 1990, OCS Section, at 11.
Further, Congress only managed to avoid a Presidential veto by adding an appeals fee
to the act, thereby allowing it to be attached to the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act
of 1990 as a revenue producing measure. See Reauthorization Amendments of 1990, §
6208(c).
123. See "National Ocean Industries Association Opposes Legislation Giving States
Veto Over OCS Leasing", PR Newswire, May 8, 1990.
124. See La. Wetlands Debut in Bush Budget, New Orleans Times-Picayune, February
5, 1991, at A-l, col. 2. See also Proposal May Give La. More Oil Money, Baton Rouge
State-Times/Morning Advocate, February 23, 1991, at IC, col. 2.
125. E.g. Plaquemines, Terrebonne, and Lafourche Parishes.
126. The same may be said for the potential "taking" problem discussed infra at text
accompanying notes 127-148. Furthermore, the oil industry can resort to other available
technologies to accomplish exploration and production in the coastal zone. This includes
directional and/or horizontal drilling and the use of alternative access vehicles such as
hovercraft. See Skora, Air Cushion Vehicles for the Transport of Drilling Rigs, Supplies,
and Oil Field Exploration Operations in the Coastal Marshes of Louisiana (1988).
19911 1105
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
consistency determination, it is not as though major flood control pro-
jects will be halted if the state does not wish them to be. Slowdowns
in Corps projects are far more likely, as the state will be using the
determination authority to force desired changes in the projects, and
the negotiations necessary to produce such changes will probably cause
delays in the projects.
Economic setbacks caused by long-range environmental decisions are
usually difficult to explain to the voters, so it is almost certain that the
course of action proposed in this comment, if implemented, would cause
heated debate in the state legislature and possibly some adverse political
fallout for the CMD. To limit these possibilities, lessen the impact of
the change, and build public support, the CMD will probably have to
move at a somewhat restrained pace for the next few years, and fully
document the environmental benefits which result from the implemen-
tation of the proposals.
Constitutional .Taking"
The fourth possible obstacle is that such a course of action may
eventually raise a fifth amendment "taking" question' 27 in court. The
question of whether the scope of the land use constraints enacted by
the SLCRMA is so onerous as to be a taking that requires compensation
has not been decided in Louisiana. However, it is doubtful that such
a challenge would prove successful as, with one major exception, 2 the
question has been answered in the negative in both the federal courts
and the courts of several other states. 129 The mere assertion of regulatory
127. U.S. Const. amend. V. "[Nior shall private property be taken for ,public use,
without just compensation."
U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1. "[N]or shall any State deprive any person of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law ......
128. See Nollan v. California Coastal Commission, 483 U.S. 825, 107 S. Ct. 3141
(1987). In Nollan, a California Court of Appeal had held that the California Coastal
Commission could condition issuance of a permit necessary to rebuild a home on the
homeowners' transfer to the public of an easement across their beachfront property, and
that such a condition did not amount to a taking. The Nollans appealed on their takings
claim to the Supreme Court. The Court held that a taking of the Nollans' property had
occurred. However, the Court relied heavily on the character of the governmental action,
i.e., that a "permanent physical occupation" of the property by someone other than the
owner would occur if the easement was required. This is in marked contrast to the
character of governmental action which would occur under the proposals made in this
comment, where no physical invasion of private property by the state would occur.
129. See Comment, Determining "Takings" Under Coastal Zone Management Pro-
grams in New York and Connecticut, 1 Pace Envtl. L. Rev. 91 (1983). See also Deltona
Corp. v. United States, 657 F.2d 1184 (Cl. Ct. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1017, 102
S. Ct. 1712 (1982).
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jurisdiction does not constitute a taking.130 Instead, a balancing of private
and public interests is required."' The Supreme Court has identified
three factors, besides the government's interest, 32 of "particular signif-
icance" in determining whether a taking has occurred: "(1) 'the economic
impact of the regulation on the claimant'; (2) 'the extent to which the
regulation has interfered with distinct investment-backed expectations';
and (3) 'the character of the governmental action."" 33
In assessing the economic impact of the regulation on the claimant,
the focus is on interference with rights in the parcel as a whole, 34 using
a comparison of the value of the property before and after regulation. 3 '
This degree of reduction in value is then used in conjunction with the
other factors to determine if a taking has occurred. While no set amount
or degree of reduction in value has been seized upon by the Court, a
denial of the 'highest and best use,' i.e., most profitable use, that
would be available in the absence of regulation" does not constitute a
taking. 36 Instead, in order to establish a taking claim, the plaintiff must
prove "that as a result of the regulation, the property's value has been
reduced and the property has no remaining economically viable use.' '1 7
Obviously, this is not an easy task for a landowner who has been
temporarily deprived of the ability to explore for minerals in one par-
ticular fashion-the dredging of canals to reach a desired wellsite.
The second factor, the extent to which the regulation has interfered
with investment-backed expectations, should not be a major problem in
the context of the proposals made in this comment. The CZMA was
originally passed in 1972, and Louisiana gave notice of an intent to
130. "[W]e have made it quite clear that the mere assertion of regulatory jurisdiction
by a governmental body does not constitute a regulatory taking .... [o]nly when a
permit is denied and the effect of the denial is to prevent 'economically viable' use of
the land . . . can it be said that a taking has occurred." United States v. Riverside
Bayview Homes, Inc., 474 U.S. 121, 126-127, 106 S. Ct. 455, 459 (1985).
131. Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260-261, 100 S. Ct. 2138, 2141 (1980).
The Supreme Court has also stated "[Tihis Court, quite simply, has been unable to
develop any 'set formula' for determining when 'justice and fairness' require that economic
injuries caused by public action be compensated by the government, rather than remain
disproportionately concentrated on a few persons." Penn Central Transp. Co. v. City of
New York, 438 U.S. 104, 124, 98 S. Ct. 2646, 2659 (1978).
132. See infra text accompanying notes 140-145.
133. Connolly v. Pension Benefit Guaranty Corp., 475 U.S. 211, 225, 106 S. Ct.
1018, 1026 (1986).
134. Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 130-31, 98
S. Ct. 2646, 2662 (1978).
135. Keystone Bituminous Coal Association v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 497, 107
S. Ct. 1232, 1248 (1987).
136. Florida Rock Industries, Inc. v. United States, 791 F.2d 893, 901 (Fed. Cir.
1986).
137. Formanek v. United States, 18 CI. Ct. 785, 797 (1989).
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participate in 1978 with the passage of the SLCRMA. Therefore any
investment-backed expectations should, at least after 1978, have been
tempered by the knowledge that the state would assert its authority
through its regulatory powers in ways which might affect the rate of
return expected. "A purchaser who purchases land with notice of stat-
utory impediments to the right to develop that land can justify few, if
any, legitimate investment-backed expectations of development rights
which rise to the level of constitutionally protected property rights."'' 8
As for land purchases before 1978, it is doubtful that many of the
landowners will be able to prove that they purchased the land solely or
primarily for the future extraction of oil and gas.
The third factor, the character of the governmental action, means
that a taking "may more readily be found when the interference with
property can be characterized as a physical invasion by government ...
than when interference arises from some public program adjusting the
benefits and burdens of economic life to promote the common good."' 13 9
Once again, in the context of the proposals made in this comment, this
factor should have little impact as there will be no physical invasion-
by the government of a landowner's property.
Finally, a critical factor in determining whether a taking has oc-
curred, and thus whether compensation is required,' 40 is the nature of
the State's interest. As the Supreme Court stated in Nollan v. California
Coastal Commission,'4 1 the standard required is "that the regulation
'substantially advance' the 'legitimate state interest' sought to be achieved
• . . not that 'the State 'could rationally have decided' that the measure
adopted might achieve the State's objective.""'1 42 However, the Court
went on to emphasize that a number of its cases "have made clear,
... that a broad range of governmental purposes and regulations satisfies
these requirements."'' 43 Given the scope of destruction in the wetlands,
the emergency nature of the situation, and the relatively well-accepted
causal relationship which exists between dredging and land loss in the
138. McNulty v. Town of Indialantic, 727 F. Supp. 604, 611 (M.D. Fla. 1989).
139. Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124, 98 S.
Ct. 2646, 2659 (1978). See also Nollan v. California Coastal Commission, 483 U.S. 825,
107 S. Ct. 3141 (1987).
140. Keystone Bituminous Coal Association v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 488, 107
S. Ct. 1232, 1243-1244 (1987).
141. 483 U.S. 825, 107 S. Ct. 3141 (1987). See also supra note 128. For an excellent
discussion of the Nollan decision and its impact on coastal zone management, see Comment,
Staring Down the Barrel of Nollan: Can the Coastal Commission Dodge the Bullet?, 9
Whittier L. Rev. 579 (1987).
142. Nollan v. California Coastal Commission, 483 U.S. 825, 834 n.3, 107 S. Ct.
3141, 3147 n.3 (1987).
143. Nollan, 483 U.S. at 834-35, 107 S. Ct. at 3147.
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coastal zone,'" it does not seem likely that Louisiana will have any
problem demonstrating to the courts a strong nexus between the more
stringent regulation of dredging and other activities that damage the
wetlands and the legitimate state interest of literally preserving its physical
being '45
More simply stated, the denial of a permit to conduct an activity
on private land must result in a "practical confiscation of property by
restraining the use of the property for 'any reasonable purpose." ' "46 Put
another way, it must 'render the property unsuitable for any reasonable
income ... and thus destroy its economic value, or all but a bare
residue of its value." 1 47 As stated in the conclusion of a law review
article on the subject:
Absent an administrative abuse of discretion, the test ...
requires a showing of an almost complete interference in a
landowner's property rights before a taking can be proven ...
it appears that the ... coastal zone legislation will enable each
state to effectively regulate land use without being overly bur-
dened by the requirement of just compensation. 14
CONCLUSION
Louisiana is at a crossroads between development and conservation.
The state has recently managed to secure federal funding from Congress
to aid the state in its wetlands preservation and restoration efforts. 4 9
While federal funding is certainly welcome and will help the state effort
in a major way, it will not alone be enough. To preserve and restore
the wetlands, the state will have to dramatically slow the rate and scope
of activities taking place in the coastal zone, and further, act to force
those still allowed to conduct such activities to do so in a manner which
produces beneficial environmental effects.
One of the few methods that the state has available to accomplish
these goals is the aggressive use of its CZMA consistency determination
powers. While the use of these powers in the manner proposed in this
comment may cause some short-term economic dislocations and con-
comitant political problems, the tangible results that can be achieved
will, in the long run, greatly outweigh such negative results. The alter-
144. See supra text accompanying notes 13-18.
145. "[Flederal and state courts have consistently recognized that the protection and
maintenance of wetlands is a proper exercise of governmental authority." Crow-New
Jersey 32 Ltd. v. Township of Clinton, 718 F. Supp. 378, 384 (D.N.J. 1989).
146. See Comment, supra note 129, at 93.
147. Id. at 95.
148. Id. at 96.
149. See supra note 124.
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native is for the state to continue the practices and policies which have
led to the current deplorable situation. As Louisiana is disappearing at
an ever accelerating rate, 150 literally being "washed away" into the Gulf
of Mexico, there does not seem to be a choice.
Armed with the newly reauthorized CZMA and its findings, policy
statements, and grants of authority to the states over OCS leasing and
non-point source pollution problems,"' Louisiana has the tools and
Congressional support necessary to effectively implement a new policy
of wetlands preservation that will truly change the manner in which
activities are conducted in the coastal zone. But the CZMA is only
effective as an environmental management tool if it is used aggressively.
As Louisiana has forty percent of the nation's wetlands and is expe-
riencing eighty percent of the nation's lOSS,152 Louisiana is in the best
position among the states to lead the way in coastal protection through
aggressive assertion of CZMA authority.
Implementation of the proposals made in this comment amounts to
nothing more than the exercise by Louisiana of the full extent of its
powers under the CZMA and the state's federally approved Coastal
Management Plan and Coastal Use Guidelines. As such, the exercise by
Louisiana of its consistency determination powers in the manner pro-
posed should survive any court challenge which may arise. The only
reasonable explanation for the state's inaction in the past is the lack
of political will to implement such an aggressive plan of action.
In sum, Louisiana has little to lose by trying. Meanwhile, much is
being lost on a daily basis while the state remains in its present posture.
Given such harsh realities, it is hoped that the state will pursue the
proposals made in this comment in as rapid a fashion as is possible.
Waiting will only allow for increased destruction in the coastal zone.
J. Christopher Martin
150. "While over 800,000 acres of south Louisiana have been lost to the Gulf of
Mexico in the last eighty years, almost sixty percent of these losses have occurred since
1956." Houck, supra note 2, at 11-12.
151. Reauthorization Amendments of 1990, §§ 6202, 6203(a)(3), 6208(a).
152. See Gulf Environmental Pressures Grow, Baton Rouge Morning Advocate, De-
cember 5, 1990, at B-l, col. 2.
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